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It takes considerable rhetorical agility to urge the public to sup-
port screening programs so as to prevent the conception of handi-
capped individuals while at the same time insisting that full re-
spect be paid to such developmentally disabled adults as are al-
ready among us.1 
 Is it possible for the same society to espouse the goals of including 
people with disabilities as fully equal and participating members and 
simultaneously promoting the use of embryo selection and selective 
abortion to prevent the births of those who would live with disabili-
ties? As currently practiced and justified, prenatal testing and em-
bryo selection cannot comfortably coexist with society’s professed 
goals of promoting inclusion and equality for people with disabilities. 
Nonetheless, revamped clinical practice and social policy could per-
mit informed reproductive choice and respect for current and future 
people with disabilities. In the first Section of this Article, I argue 
that the typical justifications offered by practitioners and researchers 
for prenatal testing are mistaken about the implications of disability. 
                                                                                                                    
 * Henry R. Luce Professor of Biology, Ethics and the Politics of Human Reproduc-
tion, Wellesley College. B.A., in Philosophy, Swarthmore College, 1969; M.S., in Social 
Work, Columbia University, 1973; Ph.D., in Social Psychology, Columbia University, 1992. 
This Article would never have been completed without significant assistance from several 
people. Renee Witlen has provided excellent research assistance, made valuable editorial 
suggestions, and challenged me to clarify obscure points by probing questions and insights. 
Mary Crossley provided constant encouragement and very helpful responses to an original 
draft. Ray Starr made some valuable suggestions that helped me organize my thoughts. 
The editors of the Florida State University Law Review bent over more than backwards to 
accommodate my schedule and my difficulty with Bluebook citation style. Erik Parens and 
Nancy Press came up with sources to expand my thinking. My greatest debt is to David 
Wasserman, whose intellectual support has enriched the structure, organization, and in-
sights throughout this Article. 
 1. HANS S. REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY 1 (2000) 
(quoting Daniel Wikler). 
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In the second Section, I explain why I discount the claim that people 
with disabilities have made great progress—notwithstanding the ad-
vent of prenatal testing. I conclude by proposing reforms to our cur-
rent prenatal testing practices that would meet the challenges posed 
by many critics. 
 What has become known as the disability rights critique of prena-
tal testing has been formulated as follows: 
 (1) Continuing, persistent, and pervasive discrimination consti-
tutes the major problem of having a disability for people them-
selves and for their families and communities. Rather than im-
proving the medical or social situation of today’s or tomorrow’s 
disabled citizens, prenatal diagnosis reinforces the medical model 
that disability itself, not societal discrimination against people 
with disabilities, is the problem to be solved. 
 (2) In rejecting an otherwise desired child because they believe 
that the child’s disability will diminish their parental experience, 
parents suggest that they are unwilling to accept any significant 
departure from the parental dreams that a child’s characteristics 
might occasion. 
 (3) When prospective parents select against a fetus because of 
predicted disability, they are making an unfortunate, often misin-
formed decision that a disabled child will not fulfill what most peo-
ple seek in child rearing, namely, “to give ourselves to a new being 
who starts out with the best we can give, and who will enrich us, 
gladden others, contribute to the world, and make us proud.”  
In these several contentions can be discerned two broad claims: 
that prenatal genetic testing followed by selective abortion is mor-
ally problematic, and that it is driven by misinformation.2 
 In what follows, I discuss these claims as applied to social institu-
tions beyond the family, arguing that researchers, professionals, and 
policymakers, who uncritically endorse testing followed by abortion, 
act from misinformation about disability, and express views that 
worsen the situation for all people who live with disabilities now and 
                                                                                                                    
 2.  Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic 
Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 
3, 12-13 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) [hereinafter Parens & Asch, Disability 
Rights Critique will refer to this specific article and PRENATAL TESTING will refer to the en-
tire work] (section three is quoting Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disabil-
ity, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 86 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 
1989) [hereinafter Asch, Reproductive Technology]). The critique is not always expressed in 
exactly this way by all those who share the perspective. Others who hold compatible posi-
tions are cited in this Article. For extensive references, see Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diag-
nosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1649 (1999) [hereinafter Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis]; Parens & Asch, Disability Rights Cri-
tique, supra, at 3-43; and REINDERS, supra note 1. 
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in the future.3 
 Bioethicists who sincerely promote the goals of inclusion and 
equality for people with disabilities assert that there is no contradic-
tion or tension between reforming such institutions as schools, work-
places, and the environment to include existing people with disabili-
ties, and seeking to prevent disability in the future through the prac-
tice of selective embryo implantation and pregnancy termination. 
Bonnie Steinbock, for example, writes: 
Disability activists have a laudable goal: to change society so that 
it is welcoming and accepting of people with disabilities. However, 
there is no reason why society cannot both attempt to prevent dis-
ability and to provide for the needs of those who are disabled. As a 
matter of fact, the rise of prenatal screening has coincided with 
more progressive attitudes toward the inclusion of people with dis-
abilities, as evidenced in the United States by the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.4 
I believe that Steinbock’s position is plausible for a different society 
than the one in which we now live, a society in which it is perceived 
to be as legitimate and respectable to have a disability as it is not to 
have one.  
 Rather than reiterate the basic outline of the critique of prenatal 
testing, I focus on Wikler’s and Steinbock’s belief that it is possible to 
respect and support existing and future people with disabilities and 
simultaneously to urge selection techniques to screen out children 
who would have disabling traits.5 I seek to examine the social context 
in which people choose to raise or not to raise children who would 
live with disabilities. My concern is to facilitate true reproductive 
choice for women by urging changes in the way prenatal testing oc-
curs and the rhetoric that surrounds it.6 
                                                                                                                    
 3. I do not speak in this Article for other members of the Hastings Center Project on 
Prenatal Testing for Genetic Disability, or for any advocacy group associated with the dis-
ability rights movement. 
 4. Bonnie Steinbock, Disability, Prenatal Testing, and Selective Abortion, in 
PRENATAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 108, 121. 
 5. Id.; REINDERS, supra note 1.  
 6. I, and nearly all others sharing a disability rights critique of prenatal testing, 
maintain an ardent pro-choice stance and assert that women should be free to make what-
ever decision they wish about maintaining a pregnancy or having an abortion. For the 
most recent elaborations of the disability rights critique, see Parens & Asch, Disability 
Rights Critique, supra note 2, at 40 nn.21-22 (referring to the work of others who share a 
pro-choice orientation to reproductive freedom and a disability rights critique of the routi-
nization of prenatal testing for disability); and see references contained in, Asch, Prenatal 
Diagnosis, supra note 2, at 1647, 1656 nn.8-17; Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My 
Mind about Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING, supra 
note 2, at 255 n.4.  
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I.   WHAT IS DISABILITY “REALLY” LIKE, OR HOW MISINFORMED ARE 
PEOPLE ANYWAY? 
 Prenatal testing, and the more recent and less common embryo 
screening and selection, are justified by mistaken assumptions about 
the quality of life of people with disabilities, and are demeaning to 
existing people with disabilities. These assumptions are mistaken for 
several reasons: 
 1) They fail to recognize the extent to which the disadvantages 
associated with impairments result from discriminatory attitudes 
and practices rather than anything intrinsic to the impairment. 
 2) They place unwarranted emphasis on the size of one’s oppor-
tunity range rather than the possibility for meaningful choice and 
rewarding outcomes within that range. 
 3) They confuse the claim that having a capacity, skill, or ex-
perience is a good, with the claim that lacking a capacity, skill, or 
experience is inevitably bad. This confusion is due in part to the 
failure to distinguish the absence from the loss of a skill, capacity, 
or type of experience, and in part from the overly-narrow descrip-
tion of what is good or valuable. 
A.   Models of Disability 
 For the past quarter century of disability scholarship and theory 
in the United Kingdom and North America, a significant tension has 
existed between what is seen as a traditional “medical model” of dis-
ability and two newer approaches, termed the “minority group 
model” and the “social model” of disability.7 Theorists with a minority 
group or a social model argue forcefully that clinicians, policymakers, 
genetic researchers, and bioethicists err in ascribing the major diffi-
culties of people with disabilities to their physical, cognitive, or emo-
tional make-up. Instead, the theorists assert that the difficulties 
should be ascribed to the mismatch between the range of people ac-
tually in the world and the institutional practices, physical struc-
tures, modes of communication, and social attitudes that assume a 
much narrower range of human beings than exist.  
                                                                                                                    
 7. Representative writing in the minority group and the social models, contrasting 
them with the medical model, can be found in VICTOR FINKELSTEIN, ATTITUDES AND 
DISABLED PEOPLE: ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (1980); JOHN GLIEDMAN & WILLIAM ROTH, THE 
UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1980); and Harlan Hahn, 
Paternalism and Public Policy, SOC’Y, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 36, 36. A very useful book dis-
cussing the merits and deficiencies of many approaches to disability policy is JEROME E. 
BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1993). For comparisons of the mi-
nority group and the social models, see Tom Shakespeare & Nick Watson, Making the Dif-
ference: Disability, Politics, and Recognition, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 546 
(Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; and Jerome E. Bickenbach et 
al., Models of Disablement, Universalism and the International Classification of Impair-
ments, Disabilities and Handicaps, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1173 (1999). 
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The point is not that humans “construct conceptual worlds,” but 
that humans construct buildings. The opportunities which are lost 
to a disabled person are to be attributed not only to the species-
atypicallity of the person’s biology, but also to the architectural de-
sign of the buildings in which some of those opportunities reside.8 
It is estimated that 19.7 percent9 of people in the United States have 
characteristics considered disabilities for purposes of public policy.10 
 Proponents of these social, or minority group, views hold that 
most of the disadvantages of having impairments are attributable 
not to the physical, cognitive, or emotional characteristics of indi-
viduals, but to the failure to account for everyone when designing 
physical, economic, and social institutions. According to the social 
and minority group models, people with nearly all prenatally detect-
able conditions—whether Down syndrome, spina bifida, Fragile X, 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle cell anemia, retinitis pigmen-
tosa, or achondroplasia—can lead fulfilling lives notwithstanding the 
characteristics that distinguish them from the non-disabled.11 Yes, 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap and the Environment, 23 J. SOC. PHIL. 105, 
109 (1992); see also BICKENBACH, supra note 7, at 135-81; Adrienne Asch, Critical Race 
Theory, Feminism and Disability: Reflections on Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 397-410 (2001); Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 213-18 (2000). 
 9. According to the 1997 Survey of Income and Program Participation taken by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, 19.7 percent of the population “had some level of disability and . . . 
12.3 percent of the population . . . had a severe disability.” JACK MCNEIL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P70-73, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC 
STUDIES 1 (2001), available at http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70s/p70-73.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 6, 2002) (on file with author). 
 10. As can be seen from note 9 and accompanying texts, who counts as a person with 
a disability, which conditions are considered “disabilities,” and whether conditions labeled 
“chronic illnesses,” “impairments,” “congenital malformations,” “genetic defects,” “deformi-
ties,” and “disorders” should be counted as disabilities are all extremely complex and be-
yond the scope of this Article. For recent discussions, see Barbara M. Altman, Disability 
Definitions, Models, Classification Schemes, and Applications, in HANDBOOK, supra note 7, 
at 97. I will refer to all health-related departures from species-typical functioning as dis-
abilities, and I consider the three-pronged definition of disability contained in the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000), as accurately describing the 
class of people with disabilities:  
 (2) The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— 
 (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
 (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
 11. Hans Reinders differentiates people with “disabilities” such as Down syndrome 
from people with “illnesses,” such as cystic fibrosis and Duchenne muscular dystrophy, ap-
plying his social analysis to the former group but claiming (without evidence) that people 
with these chronic illnesses have diminished lives because of their medical problems, and 
not because of social arrangements. See REINDERS, supra note 1. I, and many other adher-
ents of the disability critique of prenatal testing and selection, include people with all char-
acteristics that are not lethal in the first months or years of life. See Adrienne Asch, Why I 
Haven’t Changed My Mind about Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, 
PRENATAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 234 [hereinafter Asch, Reflections] (quoting other phi-
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disability might mean shorter-than-average life expectancies; might 
entail living with weakness, pain, or fatigue; might require more 
time than is typical for medical visits or hospital stays; might pre-
clude seeing, hearing, or speaking; might require moving with wheel-
chairs, crutches, or braces; or might prevent some people from read-
ing, writing, or participating in activities using numbers. Notwith-
standing these departures from the species-typical, the social and 
minority group models contend that virtually everyone with a dis-
ability can participate in many everyday activities, experience rela-
tionships, discover the world beyond themselves, and contribute to 
familial, social, political, and economic life. 
 Many in the field of bioethics such as Steinbock, Singer, Baily, 
Buchanan, and others who reject the disability rights critique of pre-
natal testing, acknowledge that a share of the problems of people 
with disabilities stem from life in a society that has still not made all 
the changes that would permit them to travel, communicate, learn, 
work, and play easily alongside their non-disabled peers. Yet they 
argue that it is better not to have a disability than to have one, and 
that it is preferable to select against the embryo or fetus with a dis-
abling trait. “The fact that a disability can be under unusual circum-
stances advantageous is consistent with its being ordinarily a disad-
vantage. . . . [D]isabilities are not generally advantageous, not some-
thing to be hoped for; indeed, they are to be avoided, if possible. They 
are not merely neutral forms of variation.”12 Peter Singer, another 
eminent bioethicist, says:  
[O]n the one hand we are naturally sympathetic to the claims of a 
disability rights movement that models itself on movements de-
fending the rights of women and ethnic minorities, and, on the 
other hand, we all accept that to have a disability is to be worse off 
than to be without the disability. 
 . . . . 
 . . . There are many things that people who are paraly[z]ed below 
the waist could not do in any society, no matter how constructed. 
They cannot visit untracked wilderness, go ice skating, or play 
football. And many other things that they can do, they can do only 
with difficulty, and with more time than it would take those who 
have the use of their legs. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The decision to abort a fetus that has, say, Down syndrome, 
is . . . . a decision that says: “Since I will only have two children, I 
                                                                                                                    
losophers with the sorts of illnesses Reinders excludes from his analysis, but who share 
much of my view). See also Diane Beeson & Troy Duster, African American Perspectives on 
Genetic Testing, in THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A 
DIVERSE SOCIETY 151 (Joseph S. Alper et al. eds., 2002) (discussing individuals and family 
members affected by cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia).  
 12. Steinbock, supra note 4, at 113. 
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want them to have the best possible prospects for a full and rich 
life. And if, at the outset, those prospects are seriously clouded, I 
would rather start again.”13 
In the same vein, Mary Ann Baily writes:  
The background to my decision is . . . my belief that, all other 
things equal, disability (specifically, a disability for which I would 
consider an abortion) would make life more difficult for my child, 
my family, and me. This is not the same thing as saying it would 
be an overwhelming burden or would make a fulfilling life impos-
sible. . . . It means only that if I have a choice, I would prefer to 
avoid them [the difficulties], for all of our sakes.14 
 In their recent book on the ethical issues posed by the new devel-
opments in genetics, four bioethicists write: “Shouldn’t parents seek 
the best—even through genetics—for their offspring? Don’t we expect 
them to?”15 During the deliberations that resulted in the book of es-
says collected in Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, we found 
that the question of just how bad or different it was to have a disabil-
ity loomed as the most contentious and divisive topic of all those we 
examined. If people with and without disabilities expect to use medi-
cine to maintain or restore health and functioning after a heart at-
tack, broken leg, or a back problem, it is because people value the ca-
pacities to move, to carry objects, and so forth. If the average lifespan 
in the United States is upwards of seventy years, and people with 
cystic fibrosis or muscular dystrophy commonly die before reaching 
age forty, it seems cruel and tragic to bring such a child into the 
world if testing and abortion could ensure that children would be free 
of the genes for those conditions. Any prospective parent would pre-
fer for a child to live out the typical lifespan rather than know that a 
child would die before the age of eighteen. Similarly, prospective par-
ents who take hearing, seeing, and walking for granted, and as inte-
gral to all of life’s rewarding pursuits, are likely to fear that a child 
who cannot do one of these things will have enormous difficulty in 
constructing any, much less many, alternative plans of life.16 Intellec-
tual disability is especially disconcerting to many in today’s society, 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Peter Singer, Severe Impairment and the Beginning of Life, 99 APA NEWSL. ON 
PHIL. & MED. 246, 247-48 (2000). 
 14. Mary Ann Baily, Why I had Amniocentesis, in PRENATAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 
64, 67.  
 15. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 156 
(2000). 
 16. I use this notion of plans of life because one of the reasons suggested for giving 
health and health care great social legitimacy is that they are seen as foundational to con-
structing virtually any satisfying life plan. In the book From Chance to Choice, the authors 
argue that advances in genetics should be used to give control over the health of future 
children to parents, so that their children may take best advantage of all the opportunities 
available to them in a complex society. Id. at 156-202. 
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based in written communication and relying ever more on people’s 
facility with words, numbers, and complex ideas. One student of ge-
netics comments that “[m]ental retardation is less desirable than 
normal mental function, in part because retardation drastically con-
tracts the range of worthwhile lives a person might be able to lead.”17 
 The question keeps emerging: Just how much of the difficulty 
posed by disability is “socially constructed?” Could there be a social 
and natural world in which it would be as easy and enjoyable to live 
with disability as it is to live without a disability? Does the answer 
depend upon the particular condition under discussion—for example, 
should cystic fibrosis be distinguished from deafness (the former af-
fecting needs for medical care and life expectancy, the latter affecting 
neither)? How much of what is negative about impairment or disabil-
ity is “intrinsic” to the condition and would remain even in a society 
more inclusive of disability than the United States in the twenty-first 
century? If people prize health, and assume species-typical seeing, 
hearing, walking, speaking, and learning as foundational, is it not 
undesirable to have a condition that reduces one’s general health or 
that limits or denies such functions as speech, hearing, cognition, or 
sight?18 
B.   Disability and the Normal Opportunity Range 
 People without any disabilities naturally assume that the typical 
complement of human capabilities is desirable, and perhaps critical, 
for most plans of life. Health care is given high priority when people 
rank important social goods because health and species-typical func-
tioning are taken to be essential for having a good life.19 Although 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Elliott Sober, The Meaning of Genetic Causation, in BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 
15, app. 1 at 347, 353. 
 18. It is important to note that prenatally diagnosable conditions include some that 
will manifest themselves at different ages in life. Cystic fibrosis and Down syndrome can 
be determined virtually immediately; muscular dystrophy, retinitis pigmentosa, and other 
conditions may not manifest themselves until childhood or adolescence; polycystic kidney 
disease or Huntington’s disease may not appear until mid-adulthood. Although some com-
mentators on prenatal testing have different views on the merits of testing depending upon 
the age of onset of the condition, I discuss the social practice of prenatal testing without 
regard to the life stage at which the condition expresses itself, for reasons discussed in the 
last section of this Article. It is also important to note that at times there is reason to dis-
tinguish between conditions that affect health—how sick one is, how often one must see 
doctors for acute distress or flare-ups of chronic conditions—from conditions often termed 
disabilities, such as deafness, blindness, and intellectual disabilities that have no medical 
component associated with them. Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environ-
ment, 23 J. SOC. PHIL. 105 (1992) (discussing the difference between the terms “disability” 
and “health”). Given that a condition can be detected prenatally and that social practices 
encourage such testing, for the purposes of this Article it does not matter whether the con-
dition is typically thought of as an illness, disorder, chronic condition, or disability. 
 19. What makes for a “good life” is a question that has lent itself to a rich body of phi-
losophical literature that cannot be adequately summarized or resolved in this Article. I 
mention it to point out that evaluating the importance of health, or of any human capacity, 
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there are variations on what “good lives” contain, many people in the 
United States would probably say that they would like their chil-
dren’s lives to include several of the following opportunities: to ap-
preciate beauty; learn about the world; master some skills; make 
contributions to others; participate in satisfying relationships; live 
without physical or psychological pain; be safe from physical harm; 
develop their own interests; find satisfying work; take care of them-
selves; be interested in other people’s welfare; and make decisions 
about their lives for themselves without pressure from others. This 
list is not meant to be exhaustive, and it is not intended to suggest 
that each life must contain all of these characteristics to be satisfac-
tory to the person living it.20 
 Bonnie Steinbock quotes a 1989 article in which I wrote: 
The inability to move without mechanical aid, to see, to hear, or to 
learn is not inherently neutral. Disability itself limits some op-
tions. Listening to the radio for someone who is deaf, looking at 
paintings for someone who is blind, walking upstairs for someone 
who is quadriplegic, or reading abstract articles for someone who 
is intellectually disabled are precluded by impairment alone. . . . It 
                                                                                                                    
can be done with reference to the kinds of lives people hope to lead for themselves, hope to 
offer their children, and seek to promote in the society. Norman Daniels’ work on justice in 
health care argues that health care is crucial for giving people access to the range of oppor-
tunity in a society, because he sees it as impossible for people with less-than-species-
typical health and functioning to be able to avail themselves of the normal opportunity 
range in the society. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE: STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 
AND HEALTH POLICY (1985). For applications in the prenatal testing context, see 
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 15. There, the authors do not explicitly set out a list of the 
components of a good life, arguing that a liberal and pluralistic society such as the United 
States must permit many very divergent life plans. However, they do state that: 
The core notion of eugenics, that people’s lives will probably go better if they have 
genes conducive to health and other advantageous traits, has lost little of its ap-
peal. Eugenics, in this very limited sense, shines a beacon even as it casts a 
shadow. Granted, when our society last undertook to improve our genes, the re-
sult was mayhem. The task for humanity now is to accomplish what eluded the 
eugenicists entirely, to square the pursuit of genetic health and enhancement 
with the requirements of justice. 
Id. at 56-57. 
 20. I make no sweeping claims for the list I give; instead I am influenced by such phi-
losophical writing on quality of life as that found in ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD 
LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP (David A. Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998). 
The list I give bears some resemblance to ideas found in Martha Nussbaum’s essay, The 
Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom, in ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION, supra, at 312, 318-
20, but note that Nussbaum insists that in order to have such a good life, persons must 
possess all these capabilities. “The ‘capabilities approach,’ as I conceive it, claims that a life 
that lacks any one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, will fall short of being a 
good human life.” Id. at 320. 
 For discussions of “the good life” as applied to philosophical issues of disability, see David 
Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 147, 195-200 (Anita Silvers et 
al. eds., 1998); and David Wasserman, Philosophical Issues in the Definition and Social 
Response to Disability, in HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 229-34. 
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is not irrational to hope that children and adults will live as long 
as possible without health problems or diminished human capaci-
ties.21 
It is possible to acknowledge that disabilities may preclude some ac-
tivities that many people find worthwhile—appreciating sunsets, rel-
ishing bird songs, experiencing the interaction of body and nature in 
a hike through the woods. But I now would put my convictions 
somewhat differently from the words Steinbock quotes. Having ca-
pacities is good, but I am not sure that any capacity is an “intrinsic” 
good. If typical capacities and health achieve value because they en-
able people to participate in facets of life, it is crucial to note how 
much of life is open, in today’s society, to people with disabilities. 
Brief acquaintance with people who have disabilities and who work, 
play, study, love, and enjoy the world should demonstrate that very 
few conditions preclude participating in the basic activities of life, 
even if some conditions limit some classes of them, or methods of en-
gaging in them. 
 As a person who is blind, I cannot see a baby’s smile, the antics of 
a friend’s dog, or the paintings of Picasso. I am quite confident that I 
would get pleasure and satisfaction from such experiences. Neverthe-
less, if people who are blind cannot enjoy one class of aesthetic ex-
periences, many others are available (weaving, sculpture, music, 
ocean breezes, etc.). When it is noted that people who are deaf create 
poetry and theater in American Sign Language, that people with mo-
bility impairments become involved in adapted or typical athletics, 
that persons with autism or Down syndrome increasingly articulate 
their own views of their needs and experiences, it is evident that 
realms of activity often thought unimaginable for people with dis-
abilities are components of many of their lives. 
C.   Having and Lacking Capacities 
 The reader without a disabling condition may be thinking: “My 
life would lose pleasure if I suddenly lost my sense of hearing or sight 
or could no longer lift weights because of a back problem!” I respond 
by acknowledging that losing capacities one has is a sad or disap-
pointing event, just as losing other things can be sad and disappoint-
ing. If I lose loved ones through death, or face the fact that a once be-
loved person is no longer important in my life, I grieve deeply. If I 
misplace a treasured letter, I can mourn its loss, but no one can say 
that I am entitled to own treasured letters or to possess the relation-
ships that produced such letters. If you take my VCR out of my house 
without my permission, you have removed something from me that I 
                                                                                                                    
 21. Steinbock, supra note 4, at 115 (quoting Asch, Reproductive Technology, supra 
note 2, at 73). 
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am happy to own and use. I will probably be angry at the loss, the 
violation of my home, the disrespect shown by taking something from 
me without my permission, and the unexpected change in my cir-
cumstances. If I become paralyzed in a car accident, I can be angry at 
reckless driving, regret the changed method of navigating in the 
world—I can even note its inconveniences or remember the pleasures 
of strolling or striding—but I am not owed the ability to stroll or 
stride, any more than I am owed a VCR. Thus, we should distinguish 
our thinking about the importance of having capacities from the dis-
tress of losing parts of life we prize, and distinguish our concerns for 
particular capacities from our concerns about losses, changes, or hu-
man carelessness or cruelty. 
 Contrary to the common belief that people born without certain 
capacities cannot understand how losing them is intolerable because 
such people never knew the joys of full health or full mobility, I con-
tend that disabled individuals are well aware of what they do not 
have. They are told all their lives what they are missing, sometimes 
merely as a description, often in tones of pity and condescension. 
They are surrounded by people enjoying paintings they don’t see, 
music they don’t hear, or sports they don’t play. It is utterly ludicrous 
to think that anyone born with a disability who is not full of sorrow 
and rage at her condition is simply denying the glories of the world 
she doesn’t know. 
 Not only must we distinguish valuing health and function from 
fearing loss, we must also distinguish valuing capacity from valuing 
the idea of choice. Walking, learning, or seeing permit choices among 
the range of activities that will be somewhat more constrained if 
someone does not have a capacity, or has less of it than is customary. 
Those who insist that a good life requires the full complement of spe-
cies-typical capabilities are driven by a passion for unrestricted 
choice and oppose any hindrance to that choice. What is prized is not 
the sensation of walking itself but how walking enables people to 
take part in certain activities that might be difficult or impossible 
otherwise. 
 No person in the world is likely to be interested in all of the physi-
cal, intellectual, and aesthetic experiences the world affords. Even 
the voracious reader will not delve into every book written in every 
language or even in her native tongue. No devotee of classical music 
will have the time to study every available work composed since the 
twelfth century. The serious athlete is unlikely to become proficient 
at every known sport or game played in her country, much less to 
discover the pleasures of games enjoyed on other continents. No pro-
ponent of the opportunity range or the “open future” expects anyone 
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to take advantage of all that the world offers.22 The people who prize 
the idea of the open future argue that people should have no barriers 
to their own exercise of choice, self-discovery, and self-realization. 
The paramount value is that people explore each possible opportu-
nity, but that nothing should get in the way of their own freedom to 
choose which opportunities to pursue.  
 If having a capacity is good, is not having a particular ability bad, 
negative, or “dis-valuable?”23 My answer is that having a capacity can 
be good, but the absence of capacity is simply an absence; it need not 
be seen as negative, “dis-valuable” to be blind any more than it is 
negative or “dis-valuable” to be shorter than some people, or to be 
mystified by higher mathematics. In these reflections on valuing ca-
pacity, I generally concur with Anita Silvers, who writes: 
[I]f disadvantage is tightly tied to impairment, its source does not 
seem to lie in the loss of something of intrinsic value. This is not to 
deny that seeing well, hearing well, and moving well possess in-
trinsic value and are crucial components of more complex activities 
having intrinsic value. Rather, it is to notice that, although the ex-
perience of engaging in these activities can be (but is not always) 
intrinsically good, not engaging in them is not intrinsically bad.24 
 If disability is a simple human variation, why do we try to pro-
mote good prenatal care in women, or to promote health in the popu-
lation? There is nothing to lament about capacities to hear, speak, 
move, or think. The difference between selecting out fetuses and pro-
tecting them (by promoting prenatal care for women) is just that. We 
protect the possibility for capacity when we promote fetal health, but 
we refuse to acknowledge or permit the growth of people who will not 
have such capacity when we select against fetuses as potential people 
with disabling traits. Similarly, there is nothing wrong with possess-
ing skills or aptitudes for athletics, physics, or carpentry; but the so-
ciety has not yet said that only people who possess such aptitudes 
are welcomed. The absence of a capacity is not necessarily “bad”; the 
opposite of having a capacity is not having it; having it and not hav-
ing it can be equally legitimate ways of living a life. 
                                                                                                                    
 22. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND STATE POWER 124-53 (W. Aiken & H. LaFollette eds., 
1980). 
 23. Parens & Asch, Disability Rights Critique, supra note 2, at 23-26 (suggesting that 
disabling traits are “dis-valuable”). As a co-author of this article summarizing delibera-
tions of a large project group, I was committed to reporting these ideas, but speaking for 
myself, I do not subscribe to this characterization of disability. There may be undesirable 
features to life with disabilities, but such features are intimately connected to the way in 
which disability is perceived, as will be discussed in the next Section of this Article. 
 24. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, su-
pra note 20, at 90-91. But note that Silvers and I differ on whether the capacities are in-
trinsically good. See id. 
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 Those who maintain that disability forecloses opportunity, and 
that any foreclosed opportunity diminishes life, focus too narrowly on 
the activity and do not see it as a means to an end, e.g., visual in-
stead of aesthetic pleasure; walking instead of mobilizing or explor-
ing; talking instead of communicating. These assumptions are de-
meaning to people with disabilities because they exaggerate their 
hardships and deprivation; obscure the injustice and discrimination 
they face; and dismiss or discount their own testimony of living rich 
and rewarding lives.25  
 Thus far, I have argued that even if species-typical health and 
function appear to be prerequisites for constructing life plans, people 
with disabilities can participate in a very large range of activities. 
Many people with disabling traits manage to have rewarding lives in 
today’s United States, making use of advances in medical treatment, 
assistive technology, and the social changes that ease participation in 
travel, school, and work.  
II.   THE LIMITS OF PROGRESS 
 Defenders of the practices of prenatal testing and embryo selec-
tion deny that these practices are incompatible with greater inclu-
sion and participation of those with disabilities. In this Section, I re-
but their claims. They claim that while prenatal testing for disability 
is becoming more widespread and routine, existing people with dis-
abilities are making dramatic strides towards social and economic 
equality. I argue that the appearance of progress is illusory, or at 
least grossly exaggerated. 
 Gaps remain between people with and without disabilities in 
terms of education, employment, income, social life, and civic partici-
pation.26 According to the traditional medical model of disability, 
those gaps are inextricably tied to the conditions themselves. With 
the advent of the minority group and social models, it has become 
possible to disentangle how factors in the built environment, modes 
of information dissemination, and laws and practices governing po-
litical participation, work, and education excluded, segregated, or 
limited the lives of people with disabilities. The richness of these lat-
ter models of disability is the legislation they helped to create, em-
bodying a national commitment to equal opportunity in education,27 
                                                                                                                    
 25. Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devlieger, The Disability Paradox: High Quality of 
Life Against All Odds, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 977, 977-88 (1999). 
 26. 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION (Harris Interactive, 
Inc. ed., 2000) (providing the results of a survey conducted for the National Organization 
on Disability) [hereinafter SURVEY]. 
 27. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). 
328  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:315 
 
public services,28 employment, transportation, and places of public 
accommodation.29 
 Those who support vigorous efforts to reduce disabling conditions 
by preventing the births of people who will have them observe these 
legal gains and the increased presence of people with disabilities in 
schools and public places to demonstrate that there is no tension be-
tween prenatal selection and including those disabled people already 
in the population.30 Under their view, it is possible to disvalue the 
disabling trait, and nonetheless to respect as social and moral equals 
people who exhibit these disliked traits. Prevailing social attitudes 
toward people with disabilities, and data about the effects of legal 
changes on employment, lead me to be anything but sanguine. 
A.   The Persistence of Negative Attitudes Toward                          
People With Disabilities 
 In passing the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 (ADA),31 
Congress recognized that millions of the nation’s population contin-
ued to be treated differently and pejoratively by the non-disabled ma-
jority:  
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority 
who have been . . . subjected to a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in 
our society . . . resulting from . . . assumptions not truly indicative 
of the . . . ability of such individuals to participate in, and contrib-
ute to, society[.]32 
In enacting the ADA and its predecessors (Title V of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,33 and the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968),34 the 
federal government recognized the need for the law to redress these 
systemic problems. Nothing in the nation’s practices toward its mil-
lions of disabled inhabitants demonstrated success in devaluing dis-
abling traits without also relegating the people with those traits to a 
status as economic and social inferiors. 
 Writing from a social constructionist perspective, David 
Wasserman contends that, “the disadvantages associated with im-
pairments have their source in pervasive attitudes of contempt and 
                                                                                                                    
 28. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (codifying Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355). 
 29. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000). 
 30. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 15; Steinbock, supra note 4. 
 31. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). 
 32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (2000) (codifying Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4156 (2000) (codifying the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718). 
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disrespect. Unlike people with obsolete skills, but like people of color, 
people with disabilities are not regarded as moral equals by the lar-
ger society, and the disadvantages they face reflect their devalua-
tion.”35 Ron Amundson explains the devaluation as follows:  
Rehabilitation literature is full of examples of how able bodied 
people think of disabled people not as having specific disabilities, 
but as being generally incompetent. This social image reinforces 
the illusion that global disadvantages and handicaps flow from na-
ture itself. In turn, the prejudice of the blind person’s global inca-
pacitation provides an excuse to reject the demands of blind people 
for the kinds of environmental modifications which would increase 
their access to goals. Like the myths which burden women and 
ethnic minorities, the myth of the globally incapacitated disabled 
person is self-supporting.36 
Outlawing discrimination in public programs, employment, and 
places of public accommodation has not markedly altered how social 
science, medicine, and bioethics discuss disability when it comes to 
making childbearing decisions. Joan Retsinas further describes this 
devaluation: 
Attitudes toward congenital disability per se have not changed 
markedly. Both premodern as well as contemporary societies have 
regarded disability as undesirable and to be avoided. Not only 
have parents recognized the birth of a disabled child as a poten-
tially divisive, destructive force in the family unit, but the larger 
society has seen disability as unfortunate. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Our society still does not countenance the elimination of dis-
eased/disabled people; but it does urge the termination of dis-
eased/disabled fetuses. The urging is not explicit, but implicit.37 
 Natalie Angier puzzles about the seeming contradictions in con-
temporary dealings with the nation’s disabled population: “[T]he 
dominant culture appears to be moving in two contradictory direc-
tions: more accommodating of disabilities in adults, but less tolerant 
of imperfections in children.”38 Surely it is logically possible to appre-
ciate the species-typical without demeaning those who depart from it, 
but the historic record and contemporary practices have not dis-
played such logic. Describing children with disabilities as children 
with “special needs,” using the euphemism of “special needs adop-
tion” when referring to placing children with disabilities in homes, 
                                                                                                                    
 35. Wasserman, Distributive Justice, supra note 20, at 175. 
 36. Amundson, supra note 8, at 114. 
 37. Joan Retsinas, The Impact of Prenatal Technology Upon Attitudes Toward Dis-
abled Infants, 9 RES. SOC. HEALTH CARE 75, 89-90 (1991). 
 38. Natalie Angier, Joined for Life, and Living Life to the Full, Twins Challenge Old 
Views, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at F1. 
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and maintaining a system of “special education” reveal that people 
with disabling conditions are “others,” not part of the total commu-
nity. Were youth with disabling traits truly viewed as deserving of 
consideration when designing schools, daycare centers, and after-
school programs, the programs would be created with the expectation 
that children differed from one another in many ways, and budget, 
staffing, and institutions would reflect the true diversity of the na-
tion’s youth.  
B.   Translating Law Into Practice 
 In the late 1980s, disability policy historian Edward Berkowitz 
noted that: “The nation concentrates too much of its money on grant-
ing tickets out of the labor force and gives too little attention to the 
demands of the handicapped for tickets into the labor force.”39 Writ-
ing about the ADA ten years after its passage, economist Richard 
Burkhauser takes a hard look at the strengths of the law and at 
what it has and has not accomplished to improve the status of people 
with disabilities:  
The ADA is a testimonial to the ability of the disability rights 
movement to affect policy and to the political power of the idea 
that people with disabilities can and should work. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [M]ost people outside the disability rights movement classify 
people with disabilities as “not expected to work.” This is true of 
the general population and more disappointingly it is true of the 
social science and public policy community. 
 . . . . 
 . . . If they [referring to children but arguably applicable to eve-
ryone with a disability] are not expected to work, there is no rea-
son to invest either in infrastructure or in broader social programs 
to turn sows’ ears into silk purses. 
 . . . . 
 . . . I am now convinced that not only are the majority of people 
able to work following the onset of a disability but that they, in 
fact, are already doing so. Hence, public policies that focus on en-
couraging work following the onset of disability are not based on 
daydreams or good wishes.40 
Another observer of the impact of the law on social inclusion and 
economic participation laments how much remains to be accom-
plished toward the law’s lofty aspirations: 
                                                                                                                    
 39. Amundson, supra note 8, at 115.  
 40. Richard V. Burkhauser, An Economic Perspective on ADA Backlash: Comments 
from the BJELL Symposium on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
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It is clear that Congress regarded the deprivation and disadvan-
tage of people with disabilities as giving moral urgency to the 
antidiscrimination mandate of the ADA. The statute is prefaced by 
the finding that people with disabilities are, as a group, among the 
least advantaged members of society (Section 2(a)(6)). 
 . . . [T]he primary beneficiaries of the ADA are the “disability 
elite”—those individuals with disabilities who possess indisputable 
competence, which they are prevented from displaying by struc-
tural or attitudinal barriers . . . . This, however, is the “trickle-
down” pattern we have come to expect from the enforcement of 
laws against race and gender discrimination; it does not offer the 
same reproach to a statute designed to eliminate discrimination as 
it would to a statute designed to improve the material condition of 
the worst-off or least advantaged.41  
 Unfortunately, the public consciousness of disability and the in-
clusion of adults who have disabilities appear more superficial than 
genuine. A decade after the passage of the ADA, and nearly thirty 
years after enactment of the Title V employment provisions of the 
Rehabilitation Act, people with disabilities are not succeeding in 
gaining access to work, and courts are frequently ruling against them 
when they bring cases of employment discrimination.42 If society 
truly believed that people with disabilities could contribute to the na-
tion’s economy, the unemployment rate would be calculated to show 
that millions of the nation’s disabled population of working age were 
not in the labor force. Considering that people with disabilities are 
estimated to be about twenty percent of the nation,43 industry’s fail-
ure to pursue their labor and business with accessible product design 
and representative advertising is astonishing, and actually detrimen-
tal to the society as a whole. 
 Despite the symbolic and tangible changes attributable to laws 
like the Americans with Disabilities Act, the nation’s disabled popu-
lation is still less educated, less employed, less involved in civic life, 
less represented in the political process, and less influential on the 
design of products than their numbers warrant. Thus, we do not have 
the inclusive society envisioned by Gliedman and Roth in their 1980 
                                                                                                                    
 41. David Wasserman, Stigma Without Impairment: Demedicalizing Disability Dis-
crimination, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 146, 153 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 
2000). 
 42. See SURVEY, supra note 26; Burkhauser, supra note 40; Ruth Colker, Winning and 
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groundbreaking work on disability that laid out a minority group 
analysis and showed that children and adults with disabilities were 
expected to play no valued social role whatsoever.44 It is in this dis-
criminatory society in which researchers develop tests to discover 
disabling traits in embryos and fetuses; clinicians urge prospective 
parents to use these tests; government bodies endorse population 
screening for certain conditions, such as cystic fibrosis,45 and support 
the use of funds from public and private health insurance to pay for 
such tests. 
III.   THE “MESSAGE” OF SELECTING FUTURE CITIZENS 
 In the preceding sections of this Article, I have discussed the con-
tention that embryo selection and prenatal testing stem from soci-
ety’s misinformation about life with disability. Life with nearly all 
disability potentially contains rewarding personal relationships, 
stimulation and discovery, self-development, and contributions to 
others. Although not every difficulty of living with a disabling condi-
tion or health problem stems from society’s failure to include its dis-
abled citizens, a very large number can be traced to discriminatory 
attitudes and the social distance and segregated or restricted oppor-
tunities created by the non-disabled majority. I now take up the 
claim that the societal promotion of the selection techniques is mor-
ally problematic. I would argue that at least some of the rhetoric that 
endorses selecting children’s characteristics conveys bias and disre-
spect for people with disabilities, and not merely information about 
the effects of a disabling trait. 
 Detractors of the disability critique have labeled one of its major 
components the “expressivist argument.”46 Although I am not com-
fortable with the term and think that the concerns about parental at-
titudes toward all children are as important as the concerns about 
disability, I continue to support a version of this argument. Before 
discussing the social practices that give rise to my belief that the ge-
netics and medical professionals are giving an offensive message, let 
me state that I am concerned with what professionals do by way of 
promoting testing; I am not making any claims that prospective par-
ents’ familial goals and reproductive decisions should be evaluated by 
outsiders, or can be understood as communications to outsiders. 
 Elsewhere I used the following words to characterize possible re-
                                                                                                                    
 44. GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 7, at 31-42. 
 45. “CF genetic testing should be offered to adults with a positive family history of 
CF, to partners of people with CF, to couples currently planning a pregnancy, and to cou-
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 46.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 15.  
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actions of the disability rights movement to the current practices of 
prenatal selection:  
People with just the disabilities that can now be diagnosed have 
struggled against an inhospitable, often unwelcoming, discrimina-
tory, and cruel society to fashion lives of richness, of social rela-
tionships, [and] of economic productivity. For people with disabili-
ties to work each day against the societally imposed hardships can 
be exhausting; learning that the world one lives in considers it bet-
ter to “solve” problems of disability by prenatal detection and abor-
tion, rather than by expending those resources in improving soci-
ety so that everyone—including those people who have disabili-
ties—could participate more easily, is demoralizing. It invalidates 
the effort to lead a life in an inhospitable world.47 
 In evaluating whether certain actions or practices send messages, 
James Lindemann Nelson contrasts flying the Confederate flag over 
the South Carolina Statehouse (which he argues sends a possibly 
negative and offensive message to African-Americans) with the uses 
of prenatal testing made by prospective parents, which he believes 
contain no clear communication and need not offend anyone.48 Like 
Nelson, I agree that the parental actions are not intended and should 
not be viewed as communicative. Nelson, however, goes on, “[b]ut 
rather than individual choices, consider the general social practice of 
developing and disseminating more and more tests for more and 
more conditions: Does that practice not express a clearer and plainly 
objectionable meaning . . . ?”49 
 Nelson concedes that prenatal testing “take[s] place against a very 
disturbing historical backdrop concerning the place to which people 
with disabilities have been assigned in American society.”50 He con-
cludes that the social endorsement of testing and abortion is much 
less settled and clear in what it intends or conveys than displays of 
the Confederate flag at the state capital.51 Perhaps he feels that if the 
societal motive for screening to prevent the births of children with 
disabilities was analogous to historical and contemporary American 
racism, there would be reason for disability advocates to limit 
women’s reproductive freedom and to ban the use of the technology. 
In this he forgets that the critique of testing and selective abortion is 
intended to change professional practice and rhetoric and to give 
more comprehensive information about disability to prospective par-
                                                                                                                    
 47. Asch, Reflections, supra note 11, at 240.  
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334  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:315 
 
ents. Critics have never intended to curtail women’s decision-making 
about their reproductive lives. 
A.   Clinical Practice 
 Clinicians providing medical services and prenatal counseling to 
pregnant women (whether obstetricians, nurse practitioners, mid-
wives, or genetic counselors) obviously play crucial roles in communi-
cating whether prenatal testing should be undertaken, what the 
tests reveal, and what they can mean for the health of the potential 
child and the life of the family. Despite the professional commitment 
to non-directiveness in genetic counseling, it is clear that many pro-
fessionals do not practice in a way that legitimates the choice to 
maintain a pregnancy of a fetus affected by a disabling trait.52 Coun-
selor education contains little opportunity for contact with disabled 
children or adults in non-medical settings where clinicians could ob-
serve how people with disabilities manage day-to-day life.53 An espe-
cially troubling example is the finding by Lippman and Wilfond that 
pediatric and prenatal genetic counseling gave radically different in-
formation about the same conditions to families.54 In situations 
where parents were raising infants and young children with Down 
syndrome and cystic fibrosis, counselors stressed ways in which lives 
of the affected children would resemble those of non-disabled peers, 
focusing on capacities for education, stimulation, play, and relation-
ships. By contrast, the stories given to prospective parents if the di-
agnosis was made prenatally concentrated on medical complications 
and differences from the lives of non-disabled children.55 Such differ-
ences in information run afoul of non-directiveness.  
 It is hard to read the very different descriptions contained in 
Lippman and Wilfond’s report of the prenatal and post-birth ac-
counts of Down syndrome and cystic fibrosis as anything other than:  
If you can avoid this bad thing, you should; if you weren’t lucky 
enough to avoid it, we don’t want to tell you how really awful it is 
going to be. We fear you won’t be able to stand it, so we will let you 
find out for yourself. We don’t have to give you news we think 
won’t help you feel good about your child. 
 If prospective parents are ever to have the opportunity to make 
thoughtful decisions about whether they are prepared to raise a child 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Parens & Asch, Disability Rights Critique, supra note 2, at 5-8. 
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with a prenatally detectable disability, they need to know as much as 
counselors can tell them about the overall experience of children and 
families living with the diagnosed condition. Omitting the ways in 
which a child with cystic fibrosis or Down syndrome can participate 
in the life of family, school, and community underscores disability as 
a negative factor, especially if the information parents are given 
about what children with either condition cannot do focuses on the 
needs for medical follow-up or on shortened life expectancy. Simi-
larly, the parent learning that her or his newborn daughter or son 
can expect to go to school, get a job, and enjoy loving relationships 
with others should not be kept in ignorance regarding the need for 
medication, therapy, or hospitalization that may be part of her or his 
child’s life. The premise of counseling, or of educating people about 
their own and their children’s possible futures, is that anyone con-
templating raising a child or actually involved in parenting will 
profit from learning about what could be in store. If professionals in 
one instance accentuate the negative, and in another instance accen-
tuate the positive, they show disrespect for the intelligence and sin-
cerity of the people who rely upon them for information and assis-
tance. Counselees in each situation deserve to learn as much as they 
can from knowledgeable professionals; and professionals betray the 
people they serve by slanting the information in the direction of a 
particular result. If counselors, midwives, and obstetricians are truly 
committed to patient decision-making and to informed reproductive 
choice, they should be providing enough information about life with a 
disabling condition so that prospective parents can imagine the ways 
in which life can be worthwhile as well as those in which it can be 
difficult. Similarly, the parent of a toddler whose health is going to be 
affected by the need for medications, home-based therapy, early edu-
cational services, or hospital stays should be able to take account of 
those factors when deciding where to live and what job to seek. The 
stated neutrality and non-directiveness of genetic counselors is very 
much open to question if further research determines that these dif-
ferences in prenatal and pediatric counseling are the norm. 
B.   Rationales for Test Development 
 Remember that scientists persuaded Congress to budget three bil-
lion dollars over fifteen years to map and sequence the human ge-
nome, promising that the new knowledge would lead to treatments 
and cures for disease and disability. “In 1988, Congress appropriated 
funds . . . to begin planning the Human Genome Project. Planners set 
a 15-year time frame, estimated that the price tag would be $3 bil-
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lion, and laid out formal goals to get the job done.”56 Francis Collins 
explains the project’s purposes this way:  
Scientists wanted to map the human genetic terrain, knowing it 
would lead them to previously unimaginable insights, and from 
there to the common good. That good would include a new under-
standing of genetic contributions to human disease and the devel-
opment of rational strategies for minimizing or preventing disease 
phenotypes altogether.57  
Although the goal is said to be cure or treatment, to date researchers 
have developed very few therapies that would help anyone now living 
with a genetic condition.58 Instead of developing therapies or treat-
ments for most of the genetic conditions for which the specific gene is 
known, researchers developed prenatal tests and embryo selection 
techniques that inform prospective parents about future children, 
but do nothing for anyone now living with a genetic condition. Some 
prospective parents will seek out information yielded by the tests 
even if they intend to continue a pregnancy regardless of the finding, 
but generally, the purpose of screening embryos or testing fetuses is 
for women (and their partners) to decide whether to carry a particu-
lar fetus to term. Several scholars who have reflected on the phe-
nomenon of prenatal testing acknowledge that the resources are allo-
cated to testing and counseling on the assumption that most people 
who learn that an embryo or fetus carries a disabling trait will not 
proceed with implantation or pregnancy. Promoting informed repro-
ductive choice may be the stated goal of test developers, but the gen-
erally expected and desired result of a disability diagnosis is the ter-
mination of that particular pregnancy in hopes that the next one will 
yield an embryo or fetus free of a detectable disabling trait.59 
 Consider that as yet there are tests for only some of the many sin-
gle-gene traits. Geneticists have not sought funding to develop the 
prenatal test for hair or eye color, for example, because these traits 
have relatively little social consequence. There is nothing negative 
ascribed to having blue eyes or brown, blond hair or black. Develop-
ers of tests for embryos and fetuses believe that prospective parents 
will (or should) wish to avoid the births of children who will have 
disabling conditions because the perceived difficulties of their lives 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Francis S. Collins, Shattuck Lecture—Medical and Societal Consequences of the 
Human Genome Project, 341 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 28, 28 (1999). 
 57. Id.  
 58. A notable exception was reported by Gina Kolata as follows: “The achievement, 
announced yesterday in France, comes after a decade of widely heralded promise followed 
by dashed hopes for the revolutionary treatment.” Gina Kolata, Scientists Report the First 
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 59. See, e.g., Arthur L. Beaudet, Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis, 47 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 603 (1990) (discussing the benefits and harms associated with the implementa-
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are likely to outweigh benefits to the child, the family, and the soci-
ety. The tests do nothing to promote the health of the developing fe-
tus or the health of the pregnant woman. Rather, they are offered so 
that people may decide against becoming a parent of a child with a 
particular characteristic that clinicians and policy makers under-
stand to be detrimental to a satisfying life for the child or the family, 
or that may require outlays of societal resources. Andrews and Hib-
bert describe the attitude toward disability found in law, science, and 
medicine as follows:  
The very notion of wrongful birth and wrongful life—conveying the 
idea that having a child with a disability that could have been 
“prevented” through abortion is a legal wrong—seems vastly at 
odds with the ideas about disability that serve as the foundation 
for the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
 . . . . 
 In large measure, the history of eugenics is a history of brutality 
against the disabled. . . . Even today, much of the writing about 
genetic discoveries includes economic analyses about the cost of 
care for people with a particular genetic mutation, implying that 
society would be better off had they not been born.60  
The authors go on to speculate that: “Once genetic disease is no 
longer seen as a random characteristic, this may reduce our commu-
nal commitment to people with genetic disabilities.”61 When commen-
tators talk about the social costs of providing medical care, educa-
tion, or supportive services for children and adults with disabilities, 
they neglect to point out that non-disabled children and adults re-
quire societal investment; that the costs of creating an accessible so-
ciety must be borne simply to assist the vast majority of people with 
non-diagnosable, non-genetic conditions that arise during a life; and 
that people with disabilities can contribute to the economy and to 
their families by virtue of the characteristics they have in addition to 
their impairments.62 
C.   Line-Drawing 
 If prenatal testing and embryo selection are not intended to give 
messages about which types of children the society will accept and 
welcome, proposals for “drawing lines” about the types of tests to be 
offered or withheld must be carefully examined and, in my view, re-
jected. Many clinicians and bioethicists fear that the consumerism of 
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assisted reproduction, the anxieties of people who delay parenting 
and expect to have only one or two children, and the pressures par-
ents feel to give their children “the best” start in life all contribute to 
a desire for “‘designer’ children.”63 To counter these tendencies, some 
are urging that researchers decline to develop, and clinicians decline 
to provide, tests that inform people about what professionals perceive 
to be traits that do not pose serious harms to the child or the family.  
 Jeffrey Botkin and Thomas Murray argue that some information 
and choice is inimical to what good parents should consider and to 
what a caring society should accept.64 Botkin distinguishes traits for 
which tests should and should not be offered by appealing to a notion 
of parental harm caused by raising children with some diagnosable 
conditions, saying that they should be able to get information “de-
signed to prevent harms to parents that are approximately the same 
magnitude as the harms of an unwanted pregnancy.”65 On his paren-
tal harm criterion, prenatal diagnosis should not be offered for late-
onset conditions, such as Huntington’s disease or breast or colon can-
cers; nor would they be made available for traits he would describe as 
not seriously threatening the interests parents should have in rais-
ing children.  
 Murray, too, opposes what he describes as the desire for perfect-
abilism, that would lead parents to seek diagnoses of “trivial” condi-
tions.66 I read Murray as believing that the conditions for which tests 
have been available are of sufficient gravity that prospective parents 
should get to decide whether or not they can imagine living with and 
adequately nurturing a child with the disability.67 Although he does 
not wish to ignore the concerns of people with a disability critique of 
prenatal selection practices, he appears to be able to imagine that 
professionals should draw the line as to which conditions parents 
should consider when making decisions about their families, and 
which they should not. When professionals develop tests and offer 
them to parents, then, Murray and Botkin would both argue for cre-
ating a list of the serious conditions that parents should think about, 
and of refusing to give prospective parents the chance to decide for 
themselves which characteristics of future children might be of sig-
nificance to them. Murray and Botkin share some of the disability 
critique of current practice; they recognize that at least some dis-
abling traits in some families do not preclude rewarding lives for in-
dividuals and families; and they disagree that prospective parents 
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2003]                         CONTRADICTORY OR COMPATIBLE? 339 
 
should retain an openness to the many characteristics that every 
child will display.  
 Sadly, I believe that the very desires that would have Murray and 
Botkin limit diagnoses to only some, but not all, characteristics that 
might be determined prenatally, turns the professional assistance to 
reproductive autonomy into the very “message” about the badness of 
disability that alarms critics of the current practices. Why should 
parents be told by test designers: “We think that cystic fibrosis, or 
muscular dystrophy, or deafness, or Down syndrome should make 
parents think at least twice before contemplating childraising; but 
other conditions are too trivial for parents to object.” If prenatal se-
lection is not intended to harm existing people with the conditions 
that can now be diagnosed and instead is designed to give value-free 
information to prospective parents, creating an official list of condi-
tions that parents should worry about will have an undesirable effect 
on the societal acceptance and self-esteem of those with the listed 
conditions. Why should it be acceptable to avoid some characteristics 
and not others? How can the society make lists of acceptable and un-
acceptable tests and still maintain that only disabling traits, and not 
people who live with those traits, are to be avoided? If it is legitimate 
to be a person with a disability, or to parent a child with such a dis-
abling condition, should the society make a list of “serious” and “triv-
ial” characteristics?  
 Endorsing testing and selecting against some traits, and refusing 
to let people select against other traits, will surely exacerbate the 
discrimination and stigmatization of future children with the listed 
conditions. I, and many others with a disability critique of the exist-
ing practices, find this suggestion of line-drawing clear evidence that 
the current arrangement and any future line-drawing reforms are 
much too close for comfort to running the Confederate flag up the 
flagpole. The flying Confederate flag tells people historically victim-
ized by racist discrimination that racism and the history of racism is 
and was acceptable; enumerating a set of testable genetic diseases 
tells people who currently have those conditions that it would be bet-
ter if prospective parents went to considerable lengths to prevent the 
births of children with those conditions. Consequently, I can only 
urge people who support reproductive choice and also support dis-
ability inclusion and equality to oppose line-drawing efforts. It must 
become as acceptable to test for tone deafness or color blindness (if 
tests are ever developed) as it now is to test for certain forms of deaf-
ness and blindness. Undoubtedly, more prospective parents will ter-
minate for the latter conditions than the former, but at least the de-
cisions will be those of the people ultimately raising children, and not 
society, in the form of its insurance carriers and clinicians as gate-
keepers. 
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 A word should be said about line-drawing in the context of the na-
tion’s continuing struggle over women’s rights to abortion. So long as 
the courts uphold women’s freedom to end pregnancies for any rea-
son during the first twenty-four weeks of gestation, most people who 
seek to use diagnostic techniques to make termination decisions will 
get the information about the fetus within the time limit for legal 
abortion. But suppose the courts were to ban abortions after the first 
trimester, or after twenty weeks of pregnancy, leaving an exception 
for abortions sought after receipt of prenatal diagnostic test results? 
Martha Field argues that any abortion exceptions based on disability 
would send just the sort of devaluing message proponents of testing 
claim is absent from the current enterprise.  
An argument based upon discrimination against the handicapped 
does not dictate whether there will be any abortion right or how 
long any such right will last. It only maintains that the same rules 
must be adopted without regard to whether the child-to-be is pro-
jected to have a disability. Under this view, states could not pro-
hibit third-trimester abortion while making an exception for dis-
ability. Nor could they make any exception for disability if they 
were able to and did prohibit abortion generally.68 
 At the outset of this Article, I indicated that I would focus on the 
question of whether society could simultaneously promote social and 
moral equality for people with disabilities in the world and nonethe-
less work to urge people not to reproduce children who would have 
disabling conditions. I believe that it will be very difficult for most 
families to consider bringing children with diagnosable disabilities 
into the world if they know that the society believes that their births 
should have been prevented. When I wrote about prenatal diagnosis 
in 1989, I described prospective mothers (and I would say all pro-
spective parents) as hoping “to give ourselves to a new being who 
starts out with the best we can give, and who will enrich us, gladden 
others, contribute to the world, and make us proud.”69 Writing about 
“maternal practice,” (but it can apply to fathers as well), Sara Rud-
dick suggests that the third basic component of maternal (or paren-
tal) work is to nurture the growing child so that she or he will be an 
acceptable member of the larger society.70 Raising children is work, 
whether or not the child has a characteristic termed a disabling trait. 
Virtually every parent worries about whether his son’s moodiness or 
her daughter’s adventurousness will cause problems down the line. 
Will children find friends, love, work, community? Will others appre-
ciate them—warts and all? Will children grow to find a place for 
                                                                                                                    
 68. Martha A. Field, Killing “The Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 110 (1993). 
 69. Asch, Reproductive Technology, supra note 2, at 86.  
 70. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 17-23 (1989).  
2003]                         CONTRADICTORY OR COMPATIBLE? 341 
 
themselves that they will take pride in, will comfortably rest in? 
 If these are the anxieties of all parents raising all children, those 
anxieties can only be heightened if parents know and love a child 
whose disabling characteristics meet with aversion, social embar-
rassment, discrimination, and exclusion. Only when policies, laws, 
medical professionals, schools, and media communicate that it is re-
spectable and legitimate to live with a disability, and only when day-
to-day reality approximates the aspirations that gave rise to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, will it be possible to imagine that 
the social problems of disability will not compound any biological 
limitations. Ever-increasing prenatal testing and vigorous enforce-
ment of existing anti-discrimination laws might continue to develop 
along their separate tracks, because geneticists and doctors work in 
arenas quite different from the advocates for greater social services, 
increased access to education, and employment for the nation’s dis-
abled population. Yet I persist in believing that as part of the goal of 
creating such a welcoming society, we must persuade professionals to 
change what they tell prospective parents about life with disability; 
convince those parents to learn about how children and adults in to-
day’s world survive and thrive; and then endorse the choices people 
make about their reproductive and family lives. 
 Daniel Wikler’s words opened this Article with what readers may 
have interpreted as irony or skepticism. I believe Wikler is commit-
ted to the project of supporting full inclusion of disabled people, but 
believes that prospective parents should refrain from producing chil-
dren whose genetic endowments compromise their life choices.71 I 
fear that the current climate in which prenatal testing takes place 
displays neither the rhetorical agility nor the social commitment to 
equality that I desire. If we are ever to make it as least as acceptable 
to bear and raise a disabled child as a non-disabled one, we must si-
multaneously commit ourselves to both social reforms that include 
all people, whatever their characteristics, and to accepting consumer-
ism in the reproductive marketplace. Creating such a climate will 
take at least as much rhetorical agility as Wikler thinks he has dis-
played.72 
                                                                                                                    
 71. REINDERS, supra note 1; E-mail from Daniel Wikler, Professor of Ethics and Popu-
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 72. In an e-mail, Daniel Wikler confirmed that he believes it is possible to support 
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 You’re right. I do think it’s possible but also that it’s difficult, i.e., that there is 
a tension. The ingredients of my view are: 
 1. In at least some cases the individual would have had greater opportunity for 
well-being, all things considered, without the disability. 
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 2. Thus if we have a choice between a population in which many have this dis-
ability and one in which few do, then all things considered more people will have 
a better chance of having greater well-being. This consideration belongs on the 
balance scale, though it is not determinative. 
 3. There is a bit of tension in holding these two thoughts in one’s head simul-
taneously: [that] this person’s disability is likely (though not certain) to decrease 
this person’s likelihood of attaining high levels of well-being; AND that this 
worth of this person is the same as everyone else’s, the disability notwithstand-
ing. 
 4. One source of tension comes from the fact that so many people with the dis-
ability do just fine. 
 5. Another source is that in some cases (for some “disabilities,” it may be most 
or even all), the reason that the trait detracts from expected likelihood of well-
being is that society is unjust (stigmatizing or unjustly unaccommodating). 
 6. A third source is that in the case of disabilities stemming from a person’s 
genes, or acquired early in life, the person’s identity and sense of community may 
be powerfully affected by having the disability, so that targeting the disability 
may be understood as denigrating that personal or social identity. 
 7. A fourth source is the historical record, in which supposedly humanitarian 
efforts to improve the well-being of future generations have in fact been unjust, 
violent, and indefensible efforts to rid societies of stigmatized people and groups 
who in most cases were highly vulnerable. We have to be on guard against this, 
even when we think our motives are above reproach.  
 Given 4, 5, 6, and 7, I don’t think there is a cost-free way out of the dilemma, 
and I’m certainly prepared to consider an argument that in some cases the di-
lemma should be resolved in favor of calling off the effort to prevent the disability 
from affecting future generations. However, in many cases my view is that the 
balance scale tilts in the opposite direction, because of 1 and 2. The important 
thing, in my view, is to grant that both sides of the balance scale have weight; 
and then to try to do a conscientious job of weighing. 
Wikler, supra note 71. 
